Israel’s
Vice PM and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tzipi
Livni Address the Diplomatic Corps
JERUSALEM
(IFM) — FM LIVNI: Welcome. I know that some of you may be
hearing something
from the other side in a similar meeting with the Palestinian
Authority in Ramallah. It’s a pity that I use the words "the
other side" because I believe that Israel and the legitimate
Palestinian government in Ramallah are on the same side. So
I believe that what I will share with you today represents
the interests of Israel as well as Palestinian society, moderate
Palestinians, and the international community. We are trying
to share the situation with you because I believe that there
is a role of the international community, and we need to understand
where we are all headed.
As you know,
the Israeli army is conducting an ongoing operation. Israel
is under attack. I think that in our previous meeting in Erez,
near the Gaza Strip, we were talking about the fact that the
range of the missiles is now longer and more cities are under
the threat of rockets coming from the Gaza Strip. And now,
unfortunately, reality demonstrates that it’s not only a matter
of smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip but that they use
them, of course, like always, against civilians, and this is
something that we cannot afford.
Israel needs
to act against this kind of terrorism. As to our goals, I believe,
of course, that as a responsible government we need to give
an answer and defend our own citizens. We cannot live in a
situation in which Israel is under daily attack. I know that
sometimes there are those who use the term "collective
punishment.” Believe me, there is now collective punishment
suffered by the citizens of Ashkelon and the citizens of Sderot,
and Israel cannot live with this. It’s not going to become
a habit in Israel or something that we are going to get used
to. We are not getting used to it, we’ll not get used to it,
and this is something which is unacceptable to any government
in the world. So basically we need to address it. We need to
give an answer to Israeli citizens. We need to give them security
and hope and a decent and normal life in these places.
Of course,
the goal is to weaken Hamas militarily and politically, and
we are doing this simultaneously. I mean, we need to attack
when they try to attack us. We need to use all the information
we have in order to attack the infrastructure of terror. We
have to attack the places in which they manufacture the rockets.
We need to attack the terrorists themselves. We also need to
address the buildup of Hamas and the fact that the Philadelphi
Corridor is being used in order to smuggle weapons. As you
saw, the weapons which are being smuggled through the Philadelphi
Corridor have become more and more problematic. As you can
see, we are talking in terms of a terrorist organization, but
we are actually dealing with a small army, a small militia,
in the Gaza Strip.
Of course,
politically there is a need to undermine Hamas because of the
dual strategy that the world, Israel and the pragmatic Palestinians
decided to adopt a few months ago, and I will refer to it because
it is also connected to the peace process. Basically, Hamas
has controlled Gaza since the elections in the Palestinian
Authority, but just a few months ago, Hamas took Gaza in what
Abu Mazen called a “coup", and they control it.
They control Gaza, they have this army, and this is the situation
in Gaza. In the West Bank we have another government, which
is supported by the international community and Israel as well,
which is a legitimate government because it accepts the parameters
of the international community to get legitimacy. I refer to
the parameters of the Quartet requirements. They represent
the national aspirations of the Palestinians to live in a state
of their own, in peace and security, I hope, with Israel. We
have a conflict with them, but we also have a mutual interest.
We see this as a mutual interest to live in peace and security
in two different states, two different homelands for two different
peoples.
Now, the
complicated situation is that, on one hand, we have the legitimate
government which cannot control the entire future territory
of the Palestinian state. The Palestinians are talking about
their state, which includes the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
and we fully support this idea of a Palestinian state. But,
clearly, according to the Annapolis understanding, any implementation
of the understanding of the peace treaty is subject to the
implementation of the Roadmap.
The idea
is that, before the creation of the state, we need to address
the situation on the ground. We need to have an effective government,
a government which can control – really control – all this
terror coming from its territories. As we said before, we cannot
afford a terrorist state, a failed state, like in Lebanon –
because we have this past experience with a government that
cannot control its territory, with an armed militia in its
territory. Of course, we cannot afford this kind of extreme
Islamic state controlled by Hamas, which is not only a terrorist
organization, which represents this extreme Islamic ideology,
Islamic resistance, without any connection to relations with
Israel, without any connection to the fact that Israel left
the Gaza Strip – by the way, not in order to come back, but
we may find ourselves in a situation that we have no other
alternative.
We decided
to have this dual strategy – on the one hand to work with the
pragmatic leaders, to support the moderates, and on the other
hand to delegitimize Hamas as a terrorist organization, to
work against terror – and to do it simultaneously because it
cannot succeed by executing only one of these two different
pillars of the same strategy. It’s not enough to work with
the moderates.
When it comes
to the pragmatics and to the extremists, to Hamas and Fatah,
to Abu Mazen and Haniyeh, it’s a zero-sum game. The idea in
working with the pragmatic leaders is to create a genuine alternative
to Hamas, a genuine political alternative, and it is a zero-sum
game. When Hamas gets stronger, it means that Abu Mazen and
Salam Fayyad are getting less and less support; and when Hamas
fails, it means that the others can get the support.
Clearly,
it’s not only the Israeli strategy. It’s not only the strategy
of the Palestinians themselves and, of course, Abu Mazen. This
was and is the strategy of the international community, and
this strategy is the basis of the Annapolis understanding.
We decided to go to Annapolis to work with the pragmatic leaders,
to start this peace process with an understanding that we are
doing so even though we are going to face terror attacks on
Israel and even though Israel needs to provide an answer to
these terror attacks.
It is crucial
to understand that we decided to do so simultaneously because
we believe that there is a need to continue and promote the
peace process. We could have waited on the first phase of the
Roadmap forever, waiting for the Palestinians to give an answer
and to act against terrorism, but we decided to promote the
peace process. On the other hand, there is an understanding
that when the situation on the ground is difficult, there will
be some temptation on both sides to stop the negotiations.
I said clearly
in Annapolis, as I said in Paris, that the success of this
peace process depends on the determination of the leaders of
both sides not to let the goings-on outside of the negotiating
room enter the negotiating room. And I didn’t only say so;
I acted accordingly. I met with Abu Ala the same day there
was a suicide bombing in an Israeli mall in the Negev, in Dimona,
in which one Israeli was killed. Some members of the government
coalition called on me to stop the negotiations because it’s
not wise or it doesn’t represent the interests of Israel to
continue negotiations under terror. And last week I had two
meetings with Abu Ala – one on Wednesday, the same time when
I received the information that an Israeli was killed at the
Sapir College campus near Sderot. And the next day we had another
meeting, on the day of the funeral. I answered a no-confidence
vote in the Israeli parliament for continuing the negotiations,
and I said clearly that we are going to continue the negotiations
because otherwise we give Hamas the keys and control of the
peace treaty because if they know that by using terror they
win the cessation of the negotiations, this would only give
them a good reason to continue terrorism.
We knew this
in advance and we decided to enter the negotiating room because
it is more important, and because only by doing it simultaneously
can we give hope for the people. In so doing, we can create
a genuine alternative to Hamas and undermine Hamas at the same
time. I also believe that the international community supported
this process. Of course, it is the legitimate right of Israel
to defend its citizens, but I think that most of the representatives
of the international community and the international leaders
are more willing, if I may say so, to support Israel in its
fight against terrorism knowing that simultaneously we are
continuing with the peace process.
This was
the deal. This was the understanding of Annapolis. And stopping
the negotiations is against the Annapolis understanding. I
think that cessation of negotiations is a mistake. I think
that it shows weakness, of course, but I think that it shows
Hamas that by using terror they can control, from Gaza, the
acts of the legitimate government and Abu Mazen in Ramallah,
and more. I am not here to blame others. I am trying to explain
to you what the strategy is and what is also needed from the
international community, and I will come to that later. And
what I say here to you I said to Abu Ala as well.
So, clearly,
I don’t expect Abu Ala and Abu Mazen to support Israel’s
acts. I am not trying to push my luck. I really understand
the sensitivity. But I also understand that when depicting
Israeli attacks, Al Jazeera abuses the situation on the ground
by telling lies. Unfortunately, during these attacks, civilians
were killed. I am not trying to change facts. But, of course,
when it comes to Al Jazeera, everything is exaggerated.
So I know
that it’s not easy for my partners to continue the negotiations.
No, it’s not easy, but I expect them to do so. I expect them
to do so because the easiest thing on earth is to quit. And
it’s not only the cessation of the negotiations. The statements
referring to Israel as Nazis, describing events in terms of
the Holocaust and all this, sends a message to the wrong people,
which is against the concept and the idea of the peace process.
I know that
they cannot control the Gaza Strip; I know that. I don’t expect
them to control the Gaza Strip, I don’t expect them to change
the situation in the Gaza Strip, unfortunately, but this is
the reality, and we decided to live with this reality. We decided
to work with them on the peace process and not to ask them
to assume responsibility when it comes to terror from the Gaza
Strip, even though this is also part of the Palestinian territory.
Abu Mazen is also the president of the Palestinians in Gaza,
not only when it comes to calls against Israel but also regarding
the situation there. But we accepted the fact that they are
too weak to control the situation.
But there
is only one choice, and in saying these things about Israel,
the results are the demonstrations not in the Gaza Strip but
in the West Bank. It doesn’t help them. It’s going to undermine
their own position, it’s going to lead people to be more extremist,
and basically it’s against the whole concept of division and
distinction between the moderates and the extremists.
Now, we are
willing and we will continue to work according to the Annapolis
understanding. We are bound to it, we believe in it and we
are willing to continue. And, as I had a phone call from Abu
Ala saying that he cannot come to our next meeting, the moment
he calls me, believe me, I will cancel all the other things
on my agenda and go to the negotiating room. But here comes
the role of the international community, and this is no less
important. I know that the international community is eager
to see results. I know that sometimes there is frustration
because of the situation on the ground. And, believe me, we
are more frustrated. I know that also in the West Bank there
are some mutual demands on Israel from the Palestinians, on
Palestinians from Israel, and sometimes it’s not according
to the book. But there is one thing that needs to be clear:
Nobody wants Hamas to succeed. Excuse me, there are some who
want Hamas to succeed: Iran, Syria and Hizbullah. Success is
not only a matter of reality; it’s a matter of perception.
If you recall,
after the war in Lebanon, when it comes to the situation on
the ground, even though Hizbullah had this loss during the
war, when Nasrallah presented it, the perception and the image
were one of victory. And nobody can afford a Hamas victory.
The first one who cannot afford a Hamas victory – a spin-off
Hamas victory as they had today, or a perception or image of
victory – is Abu Mazen. The second is Israel. And the third
is our Arab and Muslim neighbors. Egypt cannot afford it because
they don’t want to see a Muslim Brotherhood victory in Egypt.
The Jordanians cannot afford it. Nobody can afford it.
Now, I know
that when it comes to images, everybody wants to see tranquility
and peace, and even though everybody knows that Hamas controls
the Gaza Strip, there is this need within the Arab world, and
I can understand it, to see the situation become more calm
and without these kinds of casualties on the Palestinian side.
I can understand it. But, on the other hand, we need to take
our steps because nobody, neither the legitimate Palestinian
government nor the international community, has an answer for
Israeli citizens or an idea of how to change the situation
in the Gaza Strip in order to make Gaza a reality as part of
the future Palestinian state. And it’s not only a matter of
the number of Kassam rockets or GRAD rockets or others targeting
Israel today. We’re talking about the smuggling of weapons,
the buildup.
Let’s assume
that we reach a peace treaty. I hope so; this is what I’m devoted
to. How can Abu Mazen and the others control the Gaza Strip
in the future without internal fighting? They cannot. So, to
turn a blind eye to the situation in Gaza is something we cannot
afford – and "we" is Israel, "we" is Abu
Mazen and the others, and "we" is the international
community.
Now, in the
perception of a victory, Hamas uses the sensitivity of the
international community and the Arab world to human loss and
civilian casualties, and we are sensitive to them as well.
We are trying to avoid these kind of casualties, but please
don’t send condolences to both sides. It’s a terrible loss
for a mother when a child dies during a terror attack or an
Israeli attack. For the families, it’s the same horrible pain
and grief. But it’s not the same when it comes to the moral
judgment. It’s not a matter of suffering; it’s a matter of
taking the right stand. And while the terrorists are targeting
Israeli civilians directly, deliberately, without a real cause,
the Israeli soldiers are trying to target specifically the
places from which we are being attacked. And during these operations,
civilians are also paying the price. But it’s like in your
own neighborhoods. Just imagine a situation on your street,
in your backyard, in your neighbor’s backyard, where somebody
launches rockets. It’s not normal. I’m sure that you would
say that you are not willing to accept it. And if you have
children you would say, “Not in my neighborhood; I’m
not going to put my children at risk.”
They really
don’t care. We care. But we also care for the lives of our
citizens. And another thing: now we are also being blamed by
some of the Israeli citizens because we have the power, we
have jets and airplanes, we can target cities, towns and neighborhoods.
But we send our soldiers to check hour after hour after hour,
and some of them are being killed because we are trying to
prevent and avoid civilian casualties.
So excuse
me for saying so, but speaking about the cycle of violence
and that both sides need to stop the violence, and sending
condolences to both sides – excuse me, but it’s not the right
thing according to the Annapolis understanding, and according
to our goals and challenges for the future. Because Hamas takes
this as the understanding by the international community that
their terrorists are on the same stage as those who are trying
to act against terrorism. It’s like the comparison between
a murderer and somebody who killed somebody by mistake. According
to your own legal systems, there is no moral equation between
these two.
So please,
not for Israel’s sake but for the sake of the region, act against
terrorism by saying that there is no just cause for terrorism,
that terror is terror is terror, that Israel has the right
to defend itself, and that those who are in charge of the civilians
in the Gaza Strip are responsible for the situation in Gaza.
And while we are talking and while we are fighting against
terrorism, most of the crossings are open for the humanitarian
needs of the Palestinian population. In doing so, you will
also support the pragmatic leaders in the Palestinian Authority.
They don’t have an answer to the situation in Gaza. They understand
our need to do so but they are not strong enough to stand up
to their own public opinion and say so. It serves the interest
of Egypt, who understands now that the problems in the Philadelphi
Corridor are neither an Israeli problem nor a Palestinian one
but an Egyptian one.
I know that
there are some who talk in terms of the cessation of violence,
and basically in the past I used to say that, well, it depends
on Hamas. The moment they stop firing rockets, we will not
need to answer. But I want to say something slightly different
today. They are not going to be the ones who decide when to
start targeting Israel and when to stop. We are going to change
the rules of this game. We are not going to play according
to their rules; we are not willing to accept this equation
any more, and we are not going to be in a position in which,
when Israel takes out its forces, they say: oh, it’s a victory
for Hamas – let’s continue targeting Israel. We will continue
in different operations, one way or another, in order to meet
all these challenges until they understand that cessation of
violence is not something that they can decide for a day or
for a few hours but something which relates also to Israel’s
need to ensure the security of its citizens and also to prevent
any kind of a buildup of forces through the Philadelphi Corridor.
ITALIAN AMBASSADOR:
Thank you. You stated that your strategy has a goal of weakening
Hamas both militarily –
FM LIVNI:
And politically.
ITALIAN AMBASSADOR:
– that’s a reason to think that what you’ll be doing in the
next days will weaken Hamas politically.
FM LIVNI:
I said that there are three parameters in any kind of decision
as a decision maker. The first is to give security to our citizens.
And when Israel is under attack, we need to react – not to
punish Hamas but to stop it. Then we need to weaken Hamas militarily,
and yes, it helps. The political effect is more in the long
run, which is why we wanted simultaneously to continue the
peace process in order to create another option and alternative
for the Palestinian people.
Now, I know
that sometimes in the past we could see some reduction in numbers
of Hamas supporters, but I also know and understand that sometimes
when a group is under attack from the outside, they unfortunately
all gather in support of their leaders. But at the end of the
day, this is a dual strategy that can succeed not only in terms
of days but in general, in working with the pragmatic leaders
and undermining the others.
I think that,
in the last few months, the points on which Hamas has gotten
the support of the people were when they succeeded in doing
something against the interest of the others. For example,
the day they opened Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor and
broke the wall. This was the day they got the support of the
people. And they will get the support of the people the moment
Israel stops, the moment the international community calls
for cessation of violence by both sides, the moment the international
community gives them legitimacy, one way or another. They want
to control the Gaza Strip, and the problem is not only the
Gaza Strip but also how it can affect the situation in the
West Bank.
But I can
assure you that, as a decision maker – and it is more complicated
than that because there are some decisions that can help when
it comes to the first parameter but maybe don’t help
when it comes to the others. I know this, believe me. But basically
these are the parameters according to which we are working.
SOUTH AFRICAN
AMBASSADOR: Minister, I think we all understand that Israel
has the right to defend its citizens. But a problem which some
of us are grappling with is when it is said, “Yes, we
have a right.” But what about the issues of proportionality
and collective punishment?
FM LIVNI:
Okay. I think that Israel is the only state in the world in
which its Minister of Defense has today, during a time of almost
war, met with the Attorney General, the Minster of Justice,
and Foreign Ministry experts on international law, in order
to speak about and understand the terms of proportionality
in accordance with how the IDF works and will continue to work
on the ground. So, basically, it is not something that can
be judged. I hope that the international community knows that
we are trying to avoid civilian casualties, and that what is
called "collective punishment" goes against our values
and our system. But, as I said before, we are undergoing our
own collective punishment. Ashkelon is under collective punishment
by terror.
Now, it comes
down to different examples. We can discuss them. The situation
in which you have a family living in a factory where I know
there are rockets that can kill Israelis – is this proportionate
action? I think that it is proportionate. But these are the
decisions that the Israeli Chief of Staff needs to decide on
a daily basis.
More than
that, we decided to avoid civilian casualties by sending a
warning message to a place from which we knew the terrorists
act. They, on the other hand, called on civilians to live there
because we were going to attack. We prefer to attack an empty
building which is being used to manufacture rockets, even taking
into consideration that the terrorists will leave the place.
So you know what happened. All the children gathered on the
roof. Since they know that the strike usually comes from the
air, they send the children to the roof to prevent us from
targeting that building.
So, yes,
I believe that what we are doing is proportionate but I don’t
know how you can measure proportionality when you are in this
kind of situation. In a way, a war against terrorism is unfair
because, on one side, there are these terrorists. Believe me,
proportionality is something that isn’t part of their
vocabulary, and international law is not part of their vocabulary
and the Geneva Convention is not part of their vocabulary.
We are working with our hands tied because of all these rules,
and because we are part of the free world, and because this
is part of our values as well. But accidents can happen and
civilians are also being killed by Israeli operations. I am
not going to ignore it but I hope that there is a better understanding
of what we are trying to avoid.
CZECH REPUBLIC
AMBASSADOR: Minister, you said very emphatically that you are
going to change the rules of the game. Could you elaborate
on what kind of steps Israel is intending to take?
FM LIVNI:
I am trying to avoid the kind of situation in which Israeli
ministers are interviewed on television talking about this
or that operation. I shared with you the parameters for any
operation. But, for example, as I said before, in the past
they lived according to that assumption they target Israel,
Israel reacts and then Israel stops, and then they decide when
to target Israel again. What I said was that we will decide
when we stop the operation. And these are different operations
in different times. I don’t want to mislead anybody. The fact
that the Israeli soldiers left the northern part of the Gaza
Strip was not the end of what we are going to do in the Gaza
Strip. It was because their role there was over and the mission
completed. But we are going to continue, and we will stop the
moment we understand that Hamas also understands that they
are not going to use cessation or the end of operations from
the Israeli side to wait for the next time they target Israel.
So it’s not mathematics at the end of the day. But you know
something? I think that all Hamas members understand what I
was speaking about when I said that we are changing the equation
because they know what the equation was, and they changed it
by targeting Ashkelon as they did.
SLOVENIAN
AMBASSADOR: Minister, under these circumstances, do you think
that the government will be prepared to enter into some negotiations
with Hamas to achieve a ceasefire, to find a peaceful solution?
FM LIVNI:
Talking about negotiations, it depends with whom. As I said
before, with Abu Ala, Abu Mazen and the legitimate government,
I’m willing to continue the negotiations simultaneously. You
also need to understand that the moment Israel negotiates with
Hamas, the moment I enter the room with Hamas members to negotiate
any kind of treaty, it means killing the other channel. And
in the Palestinian streets, maybe this also means really killing
somebody there.
But the idea
is that terror cannot bring political gains, and it is the
others who can bring the Palestinians political gains. We live
in a world in which, as I said before, images and perceptions
mean something, and if they sense anything they perceive as
weakness, even though Israel is not weak, it will be used.
Hamas doesn’t represent the national aspirations of the Palestinians.
According to their own ideology, I don’t have the right to
live as a human being. Basically, Israel doesn’t have the right
to exist. So, when talking about these kinds of negotiations,
this ideology is not an option.
In the past,
sometimes there was a kind of an understanding, not an agreement,
a kind of understanding that they don’t attack; we don’t attack.
When I said that, as a decision maker, we will take all these
parameters into consideration, this refers to military decisions
and to other decisions. In doing so, we also need to ask ourselves
the question of timing and the position in time – where Israel
is and where Hamas is. At a particular time, Hamas may be asking
for a time-out, but they also want something which is not exactly
a real ceasefire. Maybe they want this time in order to build
up and get more weapons. So there is also a need to address
the situation in the Philadelphi Corridor. We also take the
situation on the ground into consideration when it comes to
Israel and Hamas, also in terms of how Israel assesses the
military situation and the security situation.
So, as I
said before, I cannot refer to exact military operations or
say something about the cessation of violence. I can just say
that these are the parameters that we will work according to
in any kind of decision. I think that just giving them some
time to get more weapons is against regional interests and
international interests. Giving them the feeling of success
just to gain a few days is also against regional interests.
We need to take all these parameters into consideration and,
of course, the other track as well.